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ABSTRACT 
 
Over the past few years, sex trafficking has been linked to online classified ads sites such as Craigslist.com and 
Backpage.com.  However, to date technology-based solutions have not been used to attack classified ad sites or 
the advertisers.  This paper proposes and tests a new approach to combating online sex trafficking promulgated 
via online classified ad sites – nuisance telephone denial of service (TDoS) attacks on the advertisers.  The method 
of attack is described and implications are discussed. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Online classified ads have provided a method for buyers 
of sex (known as Johns) to find providers of sex (sex 
workers).  Authorities are also concerned that some of 
the ads posted on these sites involve sex trafficking 
and/or minors.  While there is no universal definition of 
sex trafficking, in general it describes any situation 
where the trafficker (known as a pimp) uses force, 
coercion, or other forms of control in order to require a 
person to engage in sex work. Minors engaged in sex 
work are always considered to be trafficked.  The focus 
of this research is on sex trafficking as opposed to 
independent sex workers - those who have chosen to 
engage in sex work without coercion or control from 
another.      
Over the past few years legal, policy, and advocacy 
approaches have been used to try to convince classified 
ad sites (e.g., Craigslist, Backpage, etc.) to remove their 
commercial sex related ads (these ads typically appear 
under categories such as adult services, escorts, 
massage, body rubs, etc.).  These approaches have had 
only minor success and suffer from major limitations (as 
detailed below).   
Until recently the computer science and information 
technology fields have not been applied to the problem 
of combating sex trafficking promulgated via online 
classified ads.  This has begun to change.  For example, 
Mark Latonero has conducted extensive research into 
the role of technology in human trafficking, calling 
particular attention to the relationship between mobile 
devices, classified ad sites and sex trafficking [11] [12].  
However, to date, technology-based solutions have not 
been used to attack classified ad sites or the advertisers.  
This paper proposes, and tests via a proof of concept, a 
new approach to combating online sex trafficking 
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promulgated via classified ad sites – nuisance telephone 
denial of service attacks (TDoS) on the advertisers.  In 
developing this approach already existing technologies 
and methods are used, but they are combined in a unique 
manner in order to tackle the problem of online sex 
trafficking.   
 
2 BACKGROUND 
 
Online classified ad sites, such as Craigslist.com and 
Backpage.com, have a long history of involvement in 
sex trafficking. In 2009, Craigslist began charging a fee 
for posting ads in its erotic services (later adult services) 
section. Under pressure from law enforcement and other 
interest groups, Craigslist agreed to close its adult 
services section in 2010.  The revenue generated from 
this section of the site is estimated to have been about 
$3.7 million per month [1].  With the shut down of the 
adult services section of Craigslist, at least some of the 
ads that appeared in that section have now gone to 
Backpage.com. 
According to AIM Group (an interactive media and 
advertising consulting firm) [1], in August 2012 
Backpage had 3.9 million unique visits and published 
88,895 listing for escorts and body rubs. AIM also 
estimates that Backpage receives about $2.3 million in 
monthly revenue from just 23 of its almost 400 total US 
market sites and that Backpage is the revenue leader 
among similar web sites. 
Although Backpage has refused to shut down its 
adult service ads, it has agreed to limited cooperation 
with the National Center for Missing and Exploited 
Children (NCMEC).  According to testimony from 
Ernie Allen [14], President and CEO of NCMEC, in 
2011 Backpage referred 2,695 cases suspected of 
involving the sex trafficking of children. In an interview 
on CNN [6], Liz McDougall, a lawyer for 
Backpage.com, indicated the site first scans ads for 
25,000 key words and terms and then an internal team 
of about 100 reviews the ads and identifies 
approximately 400 ads to be forwarded to NCMEC 
every month.   
The speed at which advertisers post ads and the 
redundancy of ads across sites makes the manual 
policing of ads a daunting task.  Monitoring ads and 
prioritizing those that are more likely to involve sex 
trafficking or minors is difficult.  In the classified ads, 
age is self reported and images tend to be “fake” or 
altered.   
Given the significant scope of sex trafficking and the 
relative ease of using classified ad sites in its 
promulgation, the objective of this paper is to review the 
problems with current technology based approaches to 
combating sex trafficking via online ads.  The author 
details and tests a new approach - telephone denial of 
service attacks (TDOS) against the phone number 
appearing in the ads. 
  
3 POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS 
 
In attempting to deal with online sex trafficking law 
enforcement personnel have a number of options.   First, 
law enforcement can monitor sites such as Backpage to 
setup undercover stings to catch those buying and selling 
sex.  Many jurisdictions have been doing this for some 
time and it has become a standard approach [17].  
However, this method is extremely resource intensive 
and only catches a few people at a time.  Furthermore, 
the difficulty of accurately identifying ads involving 
trafficking victims, particularly minors, among the 
multitude of ads posted on these sites hinders the 
potential reach of this approach as a method of policing 
online sex trafficking.   
Second, law enforcement personnel can attempt to 
convince the site running adult services ads to shut down 
that part of the site.  While this approach worked with 
Craigslist, the significant amounts of money to be made 
by allowing adult services ads is a strong incentive to 
keep them.  As has been noted above, Backpage 
generates about $32 million per year in revenue from its 
adult services ads [1]. Thus far, coercive attempts to 
persuade the owners of Backpage to shut down its adult-
services section have failed.  In addition, legislative 
efforts have also failed.  In a recent case [20]  Backpage 
was successful in fighting the newly proposed SB 6251 
law, which sought to limit its ability to publish adult-
services ads.   
In addition to the revenue challenge, there are also 
problems of displacement.  The first problem of 
displacement involves the ability for ad placers to move 
their ads to another site, which was observed in the 
Craigslist shut down.  As reported by AIM, nearly two 
years after Craigslist shut down its adult services 
section, Backpage’s revenue from such ads jumped by 
38.2 percent  [1].  Given the ability of ad placers to find 
alternative sites, in the absence of an industry wide ban, 
this approach becomes the equivalent of combating 
online sex services advertising whac-a-mole. 
Another problem of displacement has to do with ads 
going from well-known sites that law enforcement can 
monitor more easily to underground sites that are more 
opaque and difficult for law enforcement to penetrate.  
Law enforcement officers seem to be of two minds about 
whether the shut down of sites like Craigslist and 
Backpage is desirable.  While some in law enforcement 
have benefited from cooperation with Craigslist and 
Backpage, others argue that shutting down the sites is 
the right thing to do [12].  
Third, appropriate law enforcement agencies might 
launch a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack on 
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the site as a whole or just the adult services portion of 
the site.  It should be noted that it might not be possible 
to target only the adult services sections of many sites as 
they reside on the same servers as the main site.  This 
approach would render the site unusable to those seeking 
to post an ad or to engage the services of a sex worker.  
There are two main drawbacks to this approach.  The 
first is that taking the site down via a DDoS attack might 
cause the advertisers to flee to another site – setting up 
the same whac-a-mole problem discussed above.  In 
addition, the legality of such an attack is questionable.   
Finally, instead of targeting the site for a DDoS 
attack, the author suggests it might be more effective to 
target those posting the ads with a nuisance telephone 
denial of service attack (TDoS).  A TDoS attack occurs 
when an attacker floods a phone number with incessant 
calls and/or text messages making the number 
unreachable by legitimate callers [15].  Attackers 
typically use free PBX software, such as Asterisk 
(http://www.asterisk.org/) and Internet telephony to 
launch TDoS attacks.  In fact, some attackers are even 
advertising their services (about $20 per day) on hacker 
sites [3]. A nuisance TDoS attack needs not make the 
number unreachable as the goal is to merely annoy the 
owner of the phone to a point where he or she stops 
responding to incoming calls and texts. 
This type of attack has many advantages over the 
other solutions detailed above.  First, since it targets 
those posting the ad, it is site agnostic – so it can be used 
in conjunction with sex services ads placed on any site.  
Second, it disrupts the advertisers' main means of 
communicating with buyers, namely mobile phones.  
Third, it is difficult to defend against a TDoS attack, 
especially attacks targeted at individual phones.  Finally, 
as detailed below, a TDoS attack is relatively easy and 
inexpensive to setup. 
 
4 TDOS DETAILS 
 
Traditionally, TDoS attacks have been used in 
conjunction with some type of other fraud or criminal 
behavior.  The goal is to deny the user the ability to 
receive any legitimate calls.  For example, an identity 
thief might use TDoS to flood the victim’s phone line so 
that financial institutions cannot contact the victim to 
verify activity [19].   
In order to combat online sex trafficking a complete 
denial of service is not required.  Instead the goal is to 
cause a nuisance to such an extent that it makes 
advertising online, which requires posting a contact 
phone number, infeasible.  In fact, allowing some 
legitimate calls or text messages through might enhance 
the nuisance factor as the target cannot determine 
beforehand which calls are from potential buyers (johns) 
and which are just nuisance calls. 
The TDoS approach to combating online sex 
trafficking has three main technical elements.  The first 
is using a Web crawler to find all of the ads on a given 
site and scrape the content on them.  Second, is the 
automated harvesting of the phone number from the 
body of the posted advertisement.  The third is using the 
number to implement the TDoS attack.  The entire 
process is detailed in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The TDoS Proccess 
 
 
4.1 Finding the Ads 
 
A standard Web crawler can be used to navigate through 
the various pages of interest on a particular Website that 
contains sex trafficking ads.  These sites can be found 
via simple Google searches for terms such as “escort 
ads” or “local escorts”.  On each ad page the ad details 
(ad id, date, ad body) are scraped and stored in a 
database or processed in real time.  The scrapping 
algorithm needs to be adjusted for each Website as the 
format of each is different.  For example, on 
Backpage.com the posting date and time are contained 
within a DIV class called AdInfo.  On 
LocalEscortPages.com the date and time occur 
immediately after the Posted On: text.  Since date and 
time are useful, but not necessary for the TDoS 
approach, the entire page can be scraped if needed.   
  
4.2 Phone Number Harvesting 
 
The main problem in automating the harvesting of the 
phone number is that they are posted in a variety of 
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formats.  For example, some may post the phone number 
as 555-555-5555, while others may use (555) 555-5555 
or 555 555 5555.  In addition, in some cases those 
advertising sex services attempt to obfuscate the number 
by using text – 5 five 5 or 5I5 (that’s an I not a 1) for 
example. It should be noted that there is a practical limit 
to this type of obfuscation as advertisers need the johns 
to easily decipher the number. 
Extracting a number pattern from within a larger 
body of text is relatively easy.  Many programming 
languages allow for the use of regular expressions to 
match specific number patterns.  The concept of regular 
expressions dates back to 1956 [9].  The concept of 
pattern matching via regular expressions has been 
incorporated into core UNIX functions (such as awk) 
and is a core feature in the PERL programming language 
[18]. 
If TDoS attacks prove successful, it is anticipated 
that advertisers and publishers (e.g., Backpage.com) 
might attempt to hinder phone number harvesting.  Two 
methods that might be tried are placing the number 
within an image file and using CAPTCHA technology.   
Fortunately, there are many algorithmic solutions for 
finding text within an image, known as text information 
extraction (TIE) [7].  These typically involve some form 
of preprocessing, such as localization to bound the text 
area, and filtering to remove color and background 
noise. The text area is then enhanced and fed through an 
optical character recognition (OCR) system. 
Advertisers might attempt to use some form of 
CAPTCHA (Completely Automated Public Turing test 
to Tell Computers and Humans Apart) to obfuscate the 
phone number.  This would be risky on their part, 
however, as CAPTCHA images are sometimes difficult 
to read – which might deter potential johns.  Mori and 
Malik [13] have detailed a method for breaking visual 
CAPTCHA.  More recently, researchers at Stanford 
University [4] have developed a program called 
Decaptcha, which is able to break the most widely used 
CAPTCHA schemes anywhere from 1% to over 50% of 
the time.       
If advertisers develop an obfuscation method that 
cannot be broken easily algorithmically, then law 
enforcement may need to use human resources to 
harvest the phone numbers.  This can be done internally, 
by law enforcement agents, or outsourced on sites like 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk).   
The phone numbers would need to be harvested 
(either automatically, manually, or some combination) 
on a continuous basis and fed to the voice and SMS 
attack systems. 
 
 
4.3 TDoS Voice Attacks 
 
For the TDoS attack it is important to cover both voice 
and text messaging (SMS).  For voice, a programmable 
PBX with phone lines (either hard line or VOIP) or 
multiple VOIP lines (e.g., Skype) are required.  Multiple 
lines are needed for throughput (ability to make multiple 
simultaneous calls).  The programmable PBX, which 
can be a physical PBX or software based, is used to 
obscure the caller ID in order to prevent blocking by the 
subject of the attack.  With a programmable PBX system 
the attacker can use the same phone lines, but spoof the 
caller ID with each call – making them appear to be from 
different phone numbers. 
The precise number of lines required would depend 
on how many phones are to be attacked, the rate of 
attack, and the dial time required by the system.  For 
example, if the aim is to attack 20 phones 
simultaneously with an attack rate of two calls every 
minute, this would require 40 calls every minute with a 
system that can dial, connect, and hang up every 15 
seconds.  This is a realistic estimate based on a small 
test; it is presumed that the user would hang up if the 
caller does not.  In this scenario, 10 phone lines would 
be needed, as each line would be capable of making 4 
calls per minute.  The number of lines would be reduced, 
of course, with a decrease in the number of phones to 
attack, reduction in attack rate, or increase in connection 
time.  
According to law enforcement personnel running 
undercover sting operations [2], sex services ads often 
receive an almost immediate response at the time the ad 
is placed, with further responses decreasing over the 
next few hours.  In areas where this tendency holds up, 
the goal would be to attack the phone as soon as the ad 
is posted and continue the attack at a high rate for at least 
the next hour.  The attack could continue at a slower 
pace after that.  Based on data collected from 
Backpage.com, in high volume geographic areas (like 
New York City) the rate of new ads can run as high as 
300 per hour.  Since the goal of the attack is not to render 
the target’s phone useless for calls, but rather to harass 
or annoy the target, a high number of connections per 
minute are not needed.  For harassment purposes, it is 
estimated that about 2 to 3 calls per minute would be 
sufficient.  Therefore, this attack could be done with 
about 150 lines for a low-end attack.     
It is important to consider that the target of the attack 
might allow the phone to go to voice mail, calling back 
those potential “dates” who leave a legitimate message.  
In this case, one goal of the attack would be to flood the 
voice mailbox.  This could be done with hang-up calls, 
but a more efficient method might be to use a 
prerecorded message.  The message could even contain 
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instructions for calling a hot line or law enforcement 
number.   
 
4.4 TDoS SMS Attacks 
 
As text messaging is often used to arrange meetings, it 
is important to deny this means of communication.  
Fortunately, launching a TDoS against text messaging is 
fairly simple.  First, the attacker could use the mobile 
number to lookup the carrier (e.g., Verizon, AT&T, 
etc.).  There are numerous sites that provide lookup 
databases; APIs are also available.  Each carrier 
maintains an e-mail domain that can be used to send 
SMS messages to a specific phone.  For example, if the 
advertiser’s phone number is 555-555-5555 and it is 
determined that the carrier is Verizon, the attacker could 
send a text message by e-mailing 
5555555555@vtext.com.  Clearly, the attacker would 
need to vary the sending e-mail address so the attack 
would not be blocked easily.  The exact number of 
messages that would need to be sent in order to deter 
online sex advertising is not known.  However, if the 
attack used random texts that sounded legitimate, the 
nuisance factor would become very high. 
 
4.5 TDoS Legal Issues 
 
The legal issues surrounding TDoS appear to be 
somewhat different than traditional DDoS attacks, as 
TDoS is not dealing with developing botnets or 
attacking computer systems (although it may be argued 
that a smart phone is computer system).  In the United 
States TDoS attacks appear to fall under the Telephone 
Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) of 1991 (see 
http://www.fcc.gov/guides/unwanted-telephone-
marketing-calls).  This act covers unsolicited marketing 
calls.  It also covers calls made with an autodialing 
system.  However, it explicitly excludes calls made by 
non-profit organizations and calls and messages placed 
with prior permission.  Advertising online and posting a 
phone number may constitute prior permission.  
Additional rules under the Act state that callers must 
provide caller ID information, even when prior 
permission has been given.   
It is not clear whether and how the Act would apply 
to law enforcement agencies.  Non-profit organizations 
appear to be exempt from the law.  In theory, an 
advocacy group may be allowed to initiate a TDoS 
attack legally.  Even if the organization was not exempt, 
it is not likely that the targeted party would initiate a 
complaint under the Act.  
In addition, the law clearly only applies to TDoS 
attacks that occur in the United States.  Other nations 
may or may not have similar laws.  Therefore, it might 
be useful for law enforcement and/or advocacy groups 
to test the TDoS concept outside of the United States. 
 
5 PROOF OF CONCEPT 
 
Due to the vague legal status of TDoS in the United 
States a full scale test could not be conducted.  Instead 
the authors developed a proof of concept in order to test 
each of the components of a TDoS attack on a small 
scale.  This test was divided into two main parts; the 
automated extraction of phone numbers from 
Backpage.com escort ads, and the automated voice and 
SMS attack on a mobile phone. 
First, the authors developed a PHP program to crawl 
the Backpage.com escort ads, extract the ad components 
(e.g., ad id, date, body, etc.) and store them in a 
relational database.  A convenience sample of 95,940 
ads were successfully crawled, extracted, and stored.   
Another PHP program was developed that uses 
regular expressions on the body of each ad in order to 
extract the phone number.  We began with regular 
expressions that searched for standard phone number 
formats such as (555) 555-5555, 555-555-5555, 555 555 
5555.  Using the standard regular expression formats we 
were able to extract 65,857 phone numbers from our 
sample – for a success rate of 68.64%.   
We used two main methods to improve our success 
rate.  First, we used a search and replace algorithm to 
replace all text numbers (e.g., one, two, three, etc.) with 
actual digits.  We also replaced the letter o with the digit 
0 and the letter l with the digit 1 as this was a popular 
method of obscuring the actual number.  This allowed 
the system to handle phones numbers such as 6oo 
one41seven (this is an actual example that has been 
slightly altered).  Second, we added additional regular 
expression patterns for more obscure phone number 
formats.  For example, (555)555-5555 (no spaces) and 
555--555--5555.  The combination of replacing letters 
and words with digits, and additional regular 
expressions allowed the extraction rate to increase to 
88.58%. 
Finally, we ran the extraction algorithm on a smaller 
subset of ads (300) in order to test the accuracy of the 
program.  This was an important step as we would want 
to ensure the system is not dialing an incorrect phone 
number.  The program extracted 273 phone numbers 
from the subset and these were checked manually to 
ensure accuracy.  All of the extracted numbers proved to 
be accurate.   
Next, the authors used Twilio (twilio.com) for voice 
and SMS attacks.  Twilio was chosen due to its PHP API 
integration and relatively low cost.  The voice service 
cost is $1 per month for each number, plus $0.015 per 
minute for each call.  The SMS service cost is $1 per 
month for each number, plus $0.0075 per message to 
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send.  Volume discounts are available.  In addition, other 
services or using a private PBX might prove more cost 
efficient.  
The ads in the subset of 300 were altered so that the 
original phone numbers were replaced by those under 
the control of the authors.  In all cases the original 
formatting was retained.  For example, if the phone 
number in the ad was 5one5 555 one2one2 then the new 
number might be 6one6 666 one2one2.  The Twilio API 
calls were added to the PHP program so that the numbers 
extracted were called about every 30 seconds with 
rotating caller ID’s.  When the phone is answered a 
sample voice message is heard.  This process was 
repeated for five minutes.     
A similar process was used to test the SMS 
messaging attack capability.  Again the modified 
harvested numbers were used for the attack.  In this case 
a stream of text messages were sent about every 5 
seconds.  The attack was kept up for two minutes. 
The success of this proof of concept shows that the 
idea of using TDoS as a nuisance attack on sex 
traffickers would work.  Phone numbers can be 
automatically extracted from online ads with a high 
degree of success and accuracy.  The estimated cost of 
launching such an attack in the New York City area 
would be about $150 per month for phone numbers and 
about $10 per hour for phone calls and another $14 per 
hour for SMS.  While the monthly cost for an all out 
TDoS attack would run over $35K per month, this figure 
could be brought down through bulk pricing and timing 
attacks only when activity is high (e.g., evenings, 
weekends, holidays, etc.).   
 
6 CONCLUSIONS 
 
There are a number of challenges associated with the 
common approaches to combating online sex trafficking 
via classified ad sites. The TDoS attack discussed in this 
paper provides an alternative approach.  The proof of 
concept conducted shows that such an attack can be 
launched in an automated format, with a high degree of 
accuracy. 
The TDoS method is not without some concerns.  
First, it is clear that this type of attack can and has be 
used for other, less altruistic, purposes.  TDoS attacks 
have already been launched against emergency response 
numbers [10] and have factored in extortion schemes 
[16]. 
Second, more research is needed to determine 
whether the TDoS approach may cause unintended harm 
to victims of trafficking or independent sex workers.  
For example, if a trafficking victim has reached out to a 
hotline or friend for help, attacking her phone might 
prevent a return call.   
Third, TDoS may have unintended negative 
consequences if the phone number attacked belongs to 
the sex worker and not the trafficker (pimp).  For 
example, in cases where the sex worker has a daily 
quota, the TDoS attack might make it difficult for her to 
meet her quota.  Failing to meet a quota imposed by a 
pimp typically results in abuse.  Therefore, the trafficker 
should be the main target of the attack.  Fortunately, in 
a recent thesis, Kennedy [8] details a method for 
identifying ads that are more likely to have been posted 
by traffickers (as opposed to individual victims or sex 
workers). 
Fourth, it is not clear if conducting a TDoS attack 
would be legal in the United States.  In addition, it may 
be that the legality of such an attack depends on the 
entity initiating it (e.g., law enforcement).  Until the 
legal issues surrounding TDoS are addressed a pilot 
program using this method to thwart sex trafficking 
cannot be implemented in the United States.  However, 
a review of online sex trafficking and the applicable 
laws in other countries might find a suitable arena for a 
pilot test of TDoS. 
Clearly, additional research among sex trafficking 
victims, survivors, and law enforcement on the potential 
impact of TDoS is needed prior to implementation.  
Finally, if proven to be effective in combating online sex 
trafficking, TDoS may prove a viable alternative to 
combat other forms of illicit behavior (i.e., drug sales, 
weapons sales, etc.) facilitated through the Internet, 
mobile devices and other networked technologies. 
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